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Abstract 
∎ Europe’s foreign and security policy needs to become more effective. To 
this end, the executive autonomy of European governments should be 
maximised, and legal constraints from EU law minimised – this view 
is only seemingly plausible. Only an EU foreign and security policy an-
chored in the rule of law based on the EU treaties is realistic and sustain-
able. 
∎ The EU is under pressure to meet human rights standards on the one 
hand, and demands to limit migration on the other. Three trends are 
evident: First, the EU is making new arrangements with third countries 
to control migration; second, it is using CFSP/CSDP missions to secure 
borders; third, the EU agencies Frontex and Europol are increasingly 
operating in the EU neighbourhood. 
∎ Current trends in EU foreign and security policy pose a challenge to the 
protection of fundamental rights. For example, CSDP missions such as 
the EU operation “Sophia” in the Mediterranean are largely exempt from 
judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
∎ Lawsuits have already been filed with the European Court of Human 
Rights and the International Criminal Court against Italy and the EU for 
aiding and abetting human rights violations in Libya. Anyone who does 
not respect international law also threatens the rule of law at home. This 
also applies to the EU. 
∎ The EU should resume the process of formal accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The legal limits and performance of the 
EU’s foreign and security policy would be made clearer. The German 
Council Presidency in 2020 should place the rule of law at the heart of 
European foreign and security policy. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Shifting Boundaries of the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy. 
A Challenge to the Rule of Law 
In its southern neighbourhood, the European Union 
(EU) faces a difficult tension: between the claim to the 
universal validity of human rights and compliance 
with the rule of law on the one hand, and the increas-
ingly powerful domestic demand to limit migration 
on the other. The EU is pursuing three approaches. 
First, it is striking new arrangements with third coun-
tries in order to secure European borders and facili-
tate the repatriation of irregular migrants. Second, 
it is increasingly aligning Common Security and De-
fence Policy (CSDP) missions with the internal security 
of the EU. Third, the EU is using Frontex and Europol 
in the European neighbourhood with the intention 
of projecting border security and crisis management 
mechanisms to third countries. 
These shifting boundaries in foreign and security 
policy present the EU with the difficult task of having 
to combine national, European, and international 
human rights standards with the opposing political 
objective of a restrictive refugee and migration policy. 
This conflict represents a serious challenge for the EU 
legal community: Article 21 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU) obliges the Union to promote the 
rule of law and the universal validity of human rights 
in its external action. The EU has an international 
legal personality and is bound to these objectives by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In contrast, there 
are strong political incentives to relocate migration 
control to EU third countries, and thus circumvent 
European legal requirements. Security policymakers 
justify the success of informal agreements such as the 
so-called EU-Turkey deal with the protection of the 
EU’s external borders. However, the EU has neither 
the emergency powers nor the executive freedoms to 
protect public order that could justify extrajudicial 
action. 
This tensions between legal requirements and 
political interests are currently culminating in the 
allegation that the detention of persons seeking pro-
tection in Libya violates relevant obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
the Geneva Convention, and the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union. Non-govern-
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mental organisations (NGOs) filed a corresponding 
complaint before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in spring 2018. The aim was to clarify 
who is legally responsible for the actions of the 
Libyan Coast Guard, which is supported by Italy and 
the EU. A condemnation of Italy would raise serious 
doubts about the legality of the EU’s foreign and 
security policy. In June 2019, renowned experts in 
international law lodged a preliminary case with the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) against persons 
responsible in the EU. The allegations concern the 
EU’s responsibility for crimes against humanity in 
the context of its migration policy in the southern 
Mediterranean. 
Against this background, the question arises as to 
whether, and how, the foreign and security policy 
actions of the EU meet the criteria of the rule of law. 
Does the current foreign and security policy on migra-
tion control contradict the applicable European legal 
requirements? What role does judicial oversight play 
in European foreign and security policy, especially 
where internal and external security intertwine? 
Could the EU’ accession to the ECHR possibly limit 
the executive empowerment of governments and 
strengthen the EU as a community based on the rule 
of law? 
In principle, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) can review the legality of all actions 
taken by EU institutions. This control function of the 
CJEU has been extended over the last 10 years to the 
EU’s foreign and security policy. Internal security is 
subject to more extensive obligations that arise from 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. However, the CJEU lacks the competence to 
control the political core of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and the exercise of sovereignty 
by member states in this area. In addition to the CJEU, 
the ECtHR can examine European external actions. 
This study makes the following recommendations: 
1) As authoritarianism and protectionism are on the 
rise worldwide, the EU is increasingly expected to 
put democracy, human rights, and the rule of law 
at the heart of its policies. The rule of law of Euro-
pean policy, both internally and externally, is a 
priority of the Finnish Council Presidency in 2019 
and should also be a priority for the German Coun-
cil Presidency in 2020. 
2) Contemporary European foreign and security 
policy aims for a stronger link between internal 
and external security. For a policy that is compat-
ible with principles of the European Community 
and anchored in the rule of law, the following is 
necessary: a move away from pragmatic informal 
agreements, a return to official EU agreements 
with third countries, and clearly regulated external 
actions by EU agencies in third countries. In any 
case, the CFSP and all CSDP missions should be in 
line with the evolving case law of the ECtHR. 
3) In refugee and migration policy, European policy 
must continuously weigh up questions of reasons 
of state with human rights considerations and con-
stitutional standards. With Article 6 (2) TEU, the 
EU committed itself to accede to the ECHR, which 
should clarify this balancing process. This acces-
sion process should be resumed – despite the 
objections raised by the CJEU in 2014 with regard 
to the CFSP’s special status under competence law. 
4) At first glance, anchoring the EU’s foreign and 
security policy more firmly to the rule of law 
seems to contradict the Union’s ability to act deci-
sively on this international stage. The fight against 
terrorism and the EU’s enlargement policy show, 
however, that constitutional standards and the con-
trol of EU actions by the CJEU and ECtHR are per-
fectly compatible with an effective foreign policy. 
Courts and specific supervision and complaint 
mechanisms are indispensable for the effective 
protection of fundamental rights. 
5) A central task of the European Parliament (EP) and 
the national parliaments is the oversight of execu-
tive powers and to tie them to a legal framework as 
much as possible. For contemporary European for-
eign and security policy, this is all the more press-
ing in view of the fact that the German Parliament 
does not have to approve foreign police missions, 
whereas the EP has even fewer information rights. 
Parliamentary scrutiny over European foreign and 
security policy is inadequate – hence, judicial 
oversight by the CJEU or the ECtHR is all the more 
important. 
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The EU’s foreign and security policy differs funda-
mentally from national foreign and security policy. 
The conventional foreign policy identity of the EU as 
a “normative transformation power” sui generis has 
become obsolete; in June 2016 it was redefined as 
“resilience” in the Global Strategy on Foreign and 
Security Policy of the EU (EUGS). Since then, the pro-
tection of citizens has been the primary goal, politi-
cally formulated by Jean-Claude Juncker and Emma-
nuel Macron in the vision “l’Europe qui protège” 
(“A Europe That Protects”). What results from this in 
practice, for example securing borders? Some Euro-
pean politicians believe that the EU should over-
come its existing legal order of competences and act 
with as much sovereignty as possible in order to 
protect the Union. At the same time, member state 
governments are not prepared to grant the EU the 
necessary executive powers and supranational com-
petences. This dilemma between high expectations 
of the EU and its lack of capabilities as a security 
provider is not new. 
In the European Security Strategy of 2003, the EU 
referred to the inextricable link between internal and 
external security in the context of organised crime, 
international terrorism, and regional conflicts: “In 
the age of globalisation, distant threats can be just as 
much a cause for concern as closer ones. [...] The first 
line of defence will often be abroad.”1 As in the Euro-
pean Security Strategy, the 20102 EU Internal Security 
Strategy set itself the goal of overcoming institutional 
barriers between different EU institutions and agen-
 
1 European Council, European Security Strategy. A Secure 
Europe in a Better World (Brussels, 12 December 2003), 6, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568 
enc.pdf (accessed 22 August 2019). 
2 European Council, Internal Security Strategy for the European 
Union – Towards a European Security Model (Brussels, March 
2010), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30753/ 
qc3010313enc.pdf (accessed 22 August 2019). 
cies. However, the Lisbon Treaty, which came into 
force at the end of 2009, maintained the fundamental 
separation of the CFSP from other EU policy areas, 
whereas the “third pillar” of police cooperation and 
internal security policy was formally dissolved. Full 
integration of internal and external security policies 
could not be achieved. Yet, the Lisbon Treaty reaf-
firms the claim to a coherent3 and integrated foreign 
and security policy by creating institutional bridges 
within the CFSP: the European External Action Ser-
vice and the “double hat” role of the High Represen-
tative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy. 
In this personal union, the High Representative and 
Vice-President of the Commission should establish a 
link between the external actions of the Commission 
and those of the Council. 
In May 2014, the Council of Foreign Ministers 
decided on a “comprehensive approach to European 
foreign and security policy”.4 A joint approach by 
EU institutions and member states should enable its 
operationalisation. Joint situation analyses involving 
EU delegations, early warning systems, conflict pre-
vention, mediation, and human rights policy should 
be interlinked. The claim is that security and develop-
ment can effectively reinforce each other. Finally, the 
EUGS of 2016 called for a closer link between internal 
and external security, since “our security at home 
entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbour-
ing and border regions”.5 
 
3 Article 21 (3) TEU. 
4 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the 
EU’s Comprehensive Approach, Brussels, 12 May 2014, 1, https:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu/media/28344/142552.pdf (accessed 
27 May 2019). 
5 European External Action Service, Shared Vision, Common 
Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Brussels, June 2016), 14, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf 
(accessed 27 May 2019). 
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Since the refugee crisis of 2015, this integrated 
foreign and security policy has taken a questionable 
direction.6 The practice of a foreign and security 
policy that seeks to transcend the boundaries between 
internal and external security is manifestly at odds 
with the demands of the rule of law and the treaty 
objectives of the CFSP/CSDP. Firstly, this policy is 
accompanied by an informalisation of bilateral rela-
tions between the EU and third countries, as the case 
of the EU-Turkey deal shows; secondly, EU internal 
security agencies such as Europol and Frontex act 
both internationally and executively; and thirdly, 
CSDP missions are deployed for the purposes of Euro-
pean border and migration control, as in the case of 
the EU operation “Sophia” in the southern Mediter-
ranean. 
Informalisation of EU External Relations 
Informal cooperation between individual EU states 
and countries of origin and transit has been the norm 
for decades when it comes to migration control.7 For 
example, many Maghreb states work bilaterally with 
France, Spain, and Italy because of their economic and 
historical ties. These mostly legally non-binding agree-
ments do not have to be justified to a critical public. 
Another approach is to establish binding agreements 
under EU law, which as a rule must be approved by 
the EP. Since the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1999, the control of irregular migration has 
become an explicit EU competence.8 Between 2004 
and 2014, the Union signed agreements with a total 
of 17 third countries on the readmission of illegal 
immigrants.9 
 
6 Tobias Pietz, “Nicht Migration, sondern Krisen managen: 
Wie Deutschland die zivile GSVP stärken könnte” [Managing 
Crises Rather Than Migration: How Germany Could Strengthen 
the Civil CSDP], Peacelab (Blog), 12 June 2018, https://peacelab. 
blog/2018/06/nicht-migration-sondern-krisen-managen-wie-
deutschland-die-zivile-gsvp-staerken-koennte (accessed 
27 May 2019). 
7 Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Readmission Policy in the European 
Union. Study for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (Brussels, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/425632/IPOL-LIBE_ET 
(2010)425632_EN.pdf (accessed 27 May 2019). 
8 In the Treaty of Lisbon, this competence was consolidated 
in Article 79 (3) TFEU. 
9 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cabo Verde, Georgia, Hong Kong, Macau, Montenegro, 
Since the refugee crisis of 2015, the 
EU has made informal arrangements 
to deport more people. 
However, this approach changed with the onset 
of the refugee crisis. Negotiations on further readmis-
sion agreements with Morocco, Algeria, and Belarus 
have been on hold since 2015. Instead, the EU pri-
marily uses informal agreements to increase the 
number of both voluntary and involuntary returns.10 
For example, at the Valletta Summit on Migration 
Control in November 2015, the EU reached agreement 
with numerous African states on developing further 
“practical arrangements” for repatriation.11 Depend-
ing on the third country, they are referred to as “Good 
Practice”, “Joint Migration Declaration”, or “Joint 
Ways Forward”. Third countries receive financial com-
pensation from European governments for such in-
formal agreements. Meanwhile, the EU is losing room 
for manoeuvre in negotiations due to the prolifera-
tion of informal arrangements at the bilateral and 
multilateral levels.12 
In particular, the so-called EU-Turkey deal of 2016 
represents a fundamentally different approach by EU 
heads of state and government. Under the agreement, 
Turkey committed itself to the readmission of irregu-
lar migrants and refugees who landed on Greek 
islands. In exchange, the EU promised €6 billion to 
supply Syrian refugees in Turkey, a controlled take-
over of vulnerable refugees from Turkey for each 
returned refugee from Greece, and further steps 
towards visa liberalisation. To this day, this mutual 
arrangement functions only to a limited extent.13 
 
Northern Macedonia, Pakistan, Republic of Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine. 
10 Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Informalizing EU Readmission 
Policy”, in The Routledge Handbook of Justice and Home Affairs 
Research, ed. Ariadna Ripoll Servent et al. (Abingdon, New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 83–98. 
11 Council of the European Union, Valletta Summit on Migra-
tion, 11–12 November 2015. Action Plan (Brussels, 2015), 17, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_ 
en.pdf (accessed 27 May 2019). 
12 Anne Koch, Annette Weber and Isabelle Werenfels, eds., 
Profiteers of Migration. Authoritarian States in Africa and European 
Migration Management, SWP Research Paper 4/2018 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2018), https://www. 
swp-berlin.org/en/publication/profiteers-of-migration/ 
(accessed 22 August 2019). 
13 Marie Walter-Franke, Two Years into the EU-Turkey ‘Deal’: 
Impact and Challenges of a Turbulent Partnership (Berlin: Jacques 
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De facto, the EU mainly provides financial aid while 
Turkey primarily secures its borders. Mutual obli-
gations to take over irregular migrants and persons 
seeking protection are hardly being met by either 
side. Nor is there any prospect of relief for the over-
crowded reception camps on Greek islands. 
Irrespective of this highly controversial practice, 
EU representatives and numerous capitals continue 
to stress that the EU-Turkey deal has been a successful 
model for migration control.14 The fact that no other 
comparable arrangements have been agreed with 
third countries to date is not due to a lack of financial 
offers from Europe, but to the political resistance 
of (North) African states: They do not want to set up 
extraterritorial camps for third-country nationals 
in their countries.15 Rather, all Mediterranean states 
are pushing for legal migration routes to the EU for 
their citizens. However, the EU Trust Fund for Africa 
and the recent proposals to restructure the EU’s new 
multiannual financial framework 2021–2027 aim 
to provide the most flexible financial support possible 
to those third countries that meet the EU’s interests 
in managing migration. Although the informalisation 
of European foreign policy takes place outside EU 
decision-making procedures, it is to be funded from 
the EU budget, as in the case of the EU-Turkey deal.16 
 
Delors Institute, 15 March 2018), https://www.delorsinstitut. 
de/2015/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/20180315_Two-years-
into-the-EU-Turkey-Deal_Walter-Franke.pdf (accessed 27 May 
2019). In July 2019, Turkey also declared that it no longer 
considered itself bound by the mutual takeover agreement 
of protection seekers due to new EU sanctions imposed in 
the course of a gas dispute off Cyprus. See Euroefe, “Turkey 
Suspends Deal with the EU on Migrant Readmission”, 
Euractiv (Brussels), 24 July 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/ 
section/global-europe/news/turkey-suspends-deal-with-the-eu-
on-migrant-readmission/ (accessed 2 August 2019). 
14 European Commission, A Europe That Protects Our Borders 
and Delivers on a Comprehensive Migration Policy (Brussels, May 
2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ 
files/euco-sibiu-migration.pdf (accessed 27 May 2019). 
15 Daniel Boffey, “African Union Seeks to Kill EU Plan to 
Process Migrants in Africa. Exclusive: Leaked Paper Shows 
Determination to Dissuade Coastal States from Cooperating”, 
The Guardian, 24 February 2019, https://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2019/feb/24/african-union-seeks-to-kill-eu-plan-to-
process-migrants-in-africa (accessed 27 May 2019). 
16 European Commission, The EU Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey. Factsheet (Brussels, July 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/ 
neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/frit_factsheet.pdf 
(accessed 2 August 2019). 
External Action by EU Agencies for 
Internal Security 
The EU agencies for law enforcement cooperation 
(Europol) and border and coast guard cooperation 
(Frontex) should support neighbouring countries 
of the EU to conduct migration controls and security 
measures. Since 2015, both agencies have been sig-
nificantly strengthened for this purpose. 
Europol was given a new legal basis in 201617 in 
order to process more sensitive data. A new antiter-
rorism centre has been set up to improve the flow 
of information both inside and outside the Union. 
Cooperation agreements with several North African 
countries on the exchange of personal data have been 
under negotiation since then. A European Migrant 
Smuggling Centre has also been established. The Joint 
Operational Team Mare brings together information 
relevant to criminal law from countries of origin and 
transit, the United States, EU member states, Frontex, 
and Interpol. 
Frontex has experienced the greatest growth in 
response to the refugee crisis. In November 2014, 
the Frontex sea mission “Triton” replaced the Italian 
rescue mission “Mare Nostrum”. However, the Fron-
tex ships do not patrol in Libyan waters, but only off 
the coast of Italy. There they monitor the borders and 
are supposed to take action against tugs. In the East-
ern Mediterranean, “Operation Poseidon Sea” has 
been running simultaneously for several years, also 
under the leadership of Frontex. The mission aims to 
prevent irregular immigration and cross-border crime 
from the west coast of Turkey and Egypt to Greece 
and Italy. In 2015 and 2016, however, controls failed: 
Borders could not be secured and the identity of 
irregular migrants could not be properly recorded. To 
this day, cohesion in the EU and the Schengen zone 
remains under severe stress. 
Against this background, Frontex was given a new 
legal mandate in 2016 to support border security in 
the member states.18 More border officials and tech-
nical assets technology should be available as opera-
tional reserves, and a so-called vulnerability assess-
 
17 Europol, “Europol’s New Regulation. Today, on 1 May 
2017, Europol’s New Regulation Enters into Force and Takes 
Effect in all EU Member States” (The Hague, 1 May 2017), 
https://www.Europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/Europols-
new-regulation (accessed 27 May 2019). 
18 European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European 
Border and Coast Guard (Brussels, 14 September 2016). 
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ment of the EU’s external borders has been intro-
duced. Frontex has also been authorised to carry out 
executive missions in states bordering directly on 
the EU, such as operational checks on persons and 
repatriations. 
For 2021–2027 the funds for the 
protection of the external borders are 
to be quadrupled: from €320 million 
to about €1.3 billion per year. 
In April 2019, EU institutions agreed to further 
strengthen Frontex in view of the continuing tensions 
in the EU’s common asylum policy. This latest reform 
is expected to come into force at the end of 2019. In 
the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027, 
the budget of Frontex should increase from €320 mil-
lion to about €1.3 billion per year and, among other 
things, finance a massive increase in personnel to 
10,000 border guards.19 The previous spatial restric-
tions of executive missions to bordering states is to 
be lifted. Frontex forces could thus in the future take 
action against irregular migration in African coun-
tries of origin and transit. Since the mid-2000s, Fron-
tex has established a wide range of international 
cooperation and sent liaison officers under so-called 
administrative agreements20 to contribute to mari-
time surveillance, hazard analysis, and training in 
third countries. 
A further interface between EU missions to third 
countries and the external action of Frontex and 
Europol has been established through the CSDP.21 In 
July 2018, a pilot project for the joint fight against 
crime was activated: the so-called Crime Information 
Cell within the CSDP mission European Union Naval 
 
19 European Parliament, “European Border and Coast 
Guard: 10,000-strong Standing Corps by 2027” (Brussels, 17 
April 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20190410IPR37530/european-border-and-coast-guard-
10-000-strong-standing-corps-by-2027 (accessed 27 May 2019). 
20 Currently Frontex has concluded administrative agree-
ments with 18 third countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cabo Verde, Georgia, 
Canada, Kosovo, Montenegro, Nigeria, Northern Macedonia, 
Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United States. 
21 Council of the European Union, Enhancing the Response to 
Migrant Smuggling Networks: A Comprehensive and Operational Set 
of Measures. 15250/18 (Brussels, 6 December 2018), http://data. 
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15250-2018-INIT/en/ 
pdf (accessed 27 May 2019). 
Force – Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), referred 
to as operation “Sophia”.22 Frontex and Europol 
liaison officers were sent to a mission command ship 
to deepen the exchange of information between 
the police and the military. Intelligence, for example 
from the inter-agency pilot project “Airborne Mari-
time Surveillance”, should be made available to both 
the Frontex mission “Triton” and the military opera-
tion “Sophia”. The partial suspension of operation 
“Sophia” in March 2019 brings the first Crime Infor-
mation Cell into question. Nevertheless, there is a 
growing overlap between the tasks of EU internal 
security agencies and CSDP-mandated missions 
throughout EU security policy. Who is responsible 
for the equipment and objectives of integrated EU 
missions abroad has yet to be clarified.23 
Internal Security and Border Security in 
the CFSP/CSDP 
Migration control is not legally one of the tasks of 
the CFSP/CSDP. With the increasing virulence of the 
refugee problem, however, it has moved into the 
remit of EU missions and operations. The CFSP/CSDP 
is currently faced with the challenge of reconciling 
the EU’s security interests with the requirements in 
the countries of operation, namely to resolve conflicts 
and reform the security sector. 
The EU currently has 10 civilian missions with 
around 2,500 troops in 10 different countries in the 
enlarged neighbourhood, as well as six military 
operations with approximately 2,400 soldiers in the 
Balkans, the southern Mediterranean, the Central 
African Republic, the Gulf of Aden, Somalia, and 
Mali.24 Already the first CSDP operations in the West-
 
22 EUNAVFOR Med/Frontex/Europol, The Crime Information 
Cell – “Pilot Project” Bridging Internal and External Security of EU 
(Rome, 5 July 2018), https://www.operationsophia.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Crime-Information-Cell-activation-5-
July-20178.pdf (accessed 27 May 2019). 
23 Roderick Parkes, Healthy Boundaries. Remedies for Europe’s 
Cross-border Disorder, Chaillot Paper 152 (Paris: European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, May 2019), https://www. 
iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_152_Borders.pdf 
(accessed 22 May 2019). 
24 European External Action Service, Military and Civilian 
Missions and Operations (Brussels, 5 March 2019), https:// 
eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/ 
military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en (accessed 
27 May 2019). 
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ern Balkans served the internal security of the EU. For 
example, EULEX Kosovo is not only the largest civilian 
mission to reform the police and judicial system, but 
it has also been given an executive mandate to pros-
ecute war crimes and other serious crimes. On the 
military side, the EUNAVFOR “Atalanta” mission to 
contain piracy in the Horn of Africa has been regarded 
as a successful operation at the interface between 
internal and external security. In addition to securing 
sea routes, the EU operation supports the transfer of 
pirates to civilian law enforcement on the ground. In 
Article 43 (TEU), the Treaty of Lisbon designates the 
fight against terrorism as a further task of the CSDP, 
in addition to conflict prevention, crisis management, 
and peacekeeping. The CSDP presence in the Sahel 
zone, which has been strengthened since 2012, was 
initially aimed at establishing the corresponding 
capacities of security authorities.25 
In line with the integrated foreign and security 
policy, the EU has promoted further initiatives to 
“train and equip” security forces from third countries. 
These include the armed forces as well as civil engage-
ment in the areas of police, border protection, and 
the rule of law.26 In November 2014 the Foreign Af-
fairs Council decided to launch such initiatives in 
Mali, the Horn of Africa, and the African Union. The 
results are not very convincing.27 For example in Mali, 
in view of the crisis situation and the size of the coun-
try, it is doubtful that up to 10 advisers are sufficient 
to effectively combat organised crime and Islamist 
 
25 Elodie Sellier, “Small Steps towards a Comprehensive 
Approach after Lisbon: The Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and the Fight against Terrorism”, New Journal of Euro-
pean Criminal Law 9, no. 1 (2018): 109–37. Since 2014, how-
ever, the EU under the leadership of France has been 
providing financial support to the so-called G5 task force of 
African Sahel states, which is to carry out highly controver-
sial military attacks against terrorist groups. See Moda Dieng, 
“The Multi-National Joint Task Force and the G5 Sahel Joint 
Force: The Limits of Military Capacity-building Efforts”, 
Contemporary Security Policy (2019) (online first), doi: 10.1080/ 
13523260.2019.1602692. 
26 Martina Fischer, “Besser nicht ertüchtigen als falsche 
Freunde stärken” [Better Not Train Than Strengthen False 
Friends], Peacelab (Blog), 14 May 2018, https://peacelab.blog/ 
2018/05/besser-nicht-ertuechtigen-als-falsche-freunde-
staerken (accessed 27 May 2019). 
27 European Parliament, Annual Report on the Implementation 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2018/2097(INI)) (Stras-
bourg: Committee on Foreign Affairs, 26 November 2018), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-
0392_EN.html (accessed 23 August 2019). 
terrorism. This criticism of a lack of impact also ap-
plies to the civilian CSDP mission EUCAP Sahel Niger, 
which has been operating since 2012.28 
The CSDP mission in Mali was expanded to include 
border security as a result of the migration crisis. Due 
to the increasing transit migration to Libya, the Coun-
cil of Foreign Ministers decided in the summer of 
2017, for the first time, on an EU stabilisation action29 
in Mali pursuant to Article 28 TEU. The so-called 
stabilisation team has since complemented the EU 
delegation in Mali and the civilian and military CSDP 
missions deployed there (EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM 
Mali). The EU should also cooperate with internation-
al actors present in the region, such as the United 
Nations (UN) Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).30 
The EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM 
Libya), initiated in 2013, was intended to support the 
Libyan government in internal security and border 
surveillance on land, in the air, and at sea. However, 
the security situation in Libya meant that the mission 
first had to be established in Tripoli and then moved 
to Tunis in 2014. According to the German govern-
ment, the focus of the work to date has been on 
“identifying relevant international and Libyan part-
ners on the ground and gradually establishing links 
and cooperating with the Libyan security authorities 
and actors under the Libyan unity government”.31 
Since 2017, the Dutch gendarmerie has engaged with 
Libyan authorities and trained 128 officials in the 
detection of counterfeit Schengen visas. Although 
EUBAM Libya was criticised for lacking effectiveness, 
the mandate was extended at the end of 2018 and an 
 
28 Wissenschaftlicher Dienst of the German Bundestag, 
Die europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur im Wandel [The European 
Security Architecture in Transition], Documentation WD 
2 – 3000 – 022/17 (Berlin, 2017), 13. 
29 These missions may be deployed through the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
within the CFSP procedures with the sole written consent 
of the member states. 
30 Council of the European Union, “Mali: European Union 
Supports the Stabilisation in the Central Regions of Mopti 
and Segou”, Press Release (Brussels, 4 August 2017), https:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/08/ 
04/mali-regions-mopti-segou/ (accessed 23 August 2019). 
31 German Bundestag, Bericht über das deutsche Engagement 
beim Einsatz von Polizistinnen und Polizisten in internationalen 
Polizeimissionen 2017 [Report on German Involvement in 
the Deployment of Police Officers in International Police 
Missions 2017], Bundestagsdrucksache 19/6540 (Berlin, 
13 December 2018), 12. 
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office of the mission was moved back to Tripoli. The 
mission is the so-called capacity-building of Libyan 
security forces in the areas of law enforcement, 
police, border management, combating irregular 
migration, human trafficking, terrorism, and organ-
ised crime. To this end, its personnel – currently 
consisting of 38 military and police forces from EU 
member states – will be increased.32 This can also 
be seen as technical preparation for a major CSDP 
operation in Libya, which has not yet been politically 
decided. 
Operation “Sophia”: The rescue at sea 
was not the goal in the beginning – in 
practice it was different. The result is 
a dispute within the EU. 
One mission in particular has grown out of the 
refugee crisis: the military CSDP operation “Sophia”. 
This mission was deployed at short notice in 2015 
to relieve Italy’s coast guard and combat smuggling 
networks in the central Mediterranean. The initial 
aim was to provide a pan-European response to the 
Italian rescue mission “Mare Nostrum”, which had 
just been discontinued. It was only rudimentarily 
replaced by the new Frontex mission “Triton”, which 
navigates exclusively in Italian coastal waters. The 
mandated tasks of operation “Sophia” were the iden-
tification, capture, and disposal of boats used for 
human trafficking. Sea rescue as required by inter-
national (maritime) law was not the primary mission 
objective of operation “Sophia”, but in 2016 and 2017 
the mission became heavily involved in this activity 
on an operational level.33 This led to sharp clashes 
between Italy and other EU states, which refused to 
systematically distribute refugees who were rescued 
on the high seas among them. The political dispute 
escalated and negatively impacted on EU foreign and 
security policy in the southern Mediterranean. Dis-
cussions on a sustainable mechanism for burden-
sharing, that is, a distribution of refugees among EU 
member states, fell by the wayside. In September 
2016, the Political and Security Committee decided to 
 
32 Reply on question 18 in: German Bundestag, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Planungen für “Ausschiffungszentren” in Drittstaaten 
[Plans for “Disembarkation Centres” in Third Countries], 
Bundestagsdrucksache 19/5307 (Berlin, 26 October 2018), 9. 
33 Marianne Riddervold, “A Humanitarian Mission in Line 
with Human Rights? Assessing Sophia, the EU’s Naval 
Response to the Migration Crisis”, European Security 27, no. 2 
(2018): 158–74. 
entrust operation “Sophia” with two new tasks. Since 
then, it has contributed to the capacity-building of 
the Libyan Coast Guard and prevented the illegal 
transport of weapons in the operational area.34 In 
sum, both the mandate and the operational evolution 
of “Sophia” were highly controversial, even before the 
suspension of the maritime component in June 2018. 
At the same time, their commander was instructed 
not to deploy any more ships in the Mediterranean. 
This effectively suspended rescue at sea. Since March 
2019, Sophia has been officially limited to surveil-
lance from air, while its mandate is subject to review 
and renewal every six month. 
 
 
34 According to Resolution 1970 (2011) of the UN Security 
Council and subsequent resolutions, in particular Resolution 
2292 (2016) on the arms embargo against Libya, Operation 
“Sophia” officially received a mandate to maintain inter-
national peace and security. Therefore, military assets may 
also be used outside international waters in Libyan territory 
within the framework of this operation. 
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The informalisation of agreements with third coun-
tries, the international role of EU agencies for inter-
nal security, and the use of CSDP missions for migra-
tion control pose considerable challenges for the 
EU as a community of law. In principle, the CJEU in 
Luxembourg has a primary mandate to review the 
decisions of all EU institutions in accordance with 
Union law.35 Whether a measure can be attributed 
to external action or to the internal policies of the EU 
makes no difference from a rule of law perspective. 
The work of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union is essentially 
about shaping a European 
legal community. 
The core of the work of the CJEU is the shaping of 
the European legal community.36 In particular, the 
standards of the Charter of Fundamental Rights must 
be respected in all respects since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty at the end of 2009.37 After a 
transitional period up to 2014, EU internal security 
policy – including its agencies – has also come 
under the supervision of the CJEU. However, the 
supervisory role of the CJEU does not extend to opera-
tional security or investigatory measures taken by 
national authorities.38 
 
35 Article 19 (1) TEU; Article 263 TFEU. 
36 Armin von Bogdandy, “Ways to Frame the European 
Rule of Law: Rechtsgemeinschaft, Trust, Revolution, and 
Kantian Peace”, European Constitutional Law Review 14, no. 4 
(2018): 675–99. 
37 Gráinne de Búrca, “After the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: The Court of Justice As a Human Rights Adjudicator?”, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 20, no. 2 
(2013): 168–84. 
38 Article 276 TFEU. 
A further restriction in primary law exists: Accord-
ing to Article 24 (1) TEU, the CJEU remains excluded 
from the intergovernmental CFSP and CSDP. The EU’s 
foreign and security policy maintains a traditional 
core area of executive control by the member states. 
At the same time, there are provisions that contain 
this particular policy area.39 According to Article 40 
TEU, the CJEU must pay particular attention to the 
delimitation of the CFSP as a substantive policy. This 
is intended to prevent an extension of the intergov-
ernmental decision-making regime to communitar-
ised EU policy areas. Furthermore, natural and legal 
persons affected by EU external sanctions have 
the right to a fair trial and to a remedy. Both can be 
checked by the CJEU.40 
Overall, the CJEU has extended its oversight role 
of EU security policy. Yet the CJEU cannot keep pace 
with all the recent developments in integrated EU 
external action. European governments intend to 
extend their executive power in foreign policy as far 
as possible. Thus, the three trends of informalisation 
of agreements with third countries, the international 
role of EU agencies for internal security, and the use 
of CSDP missions for migration control pose a prob-
lem for an EU foreign and security policy anchored 
in the rule of law. There is a continuing conflict of 
objectives between executive self-empowerment 
through informal governance on the one hand, and 
its lack of legitimacy when avoiding the EU’s Com-
munity method on the other. 
 
39 Graham Butler, “The Coming of Age of the Court’s 
Jurisdiction in the Common Foreign and Security Policy”, 
European Constitutional Law Review 13, no. 4 (2017): 673–703. 
40 Decisions pursuant to Article 215 (2) TFEU. 
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International Agreements on Internal 
Security and Border Control 
The CJEU has repeatedly annulled EU international 
agreements on sensitive security issues. The best-
known case is the EU-US Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) agreement, for which the EP already sued the 
Council in 2006 for an appropriate legal basis and the 
related co-decision procedure.41 Similarly, the CJEU 
rejected the validity of the PNR agreement between 
the EU and Canada in 2017. The provisions on man-
datory data retention did not correspond to a strict 
interpretation of the necessity and proportionality of 
averting terrorist threats.42 As early as 2015, the CJEU 
had decided on the transfer of commercially collected 
data to the United States:43 The right to privacy, the 
protection of personal data, and the guarantee of an 
effective remedy under the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights should be guaranteed extraterritorially.44 
EU-Turkey deal: The CJEU has rejected 
a complaint by three asylum seekers 
on formal grounds. It has declared 
the case to be out of its jurisdiction. 
With regard to the externalisation of EU migration 
and border controls to third countries, it is not yet 
 
41 ECJ, Parliament v. Council, 30 May 2006, C-317/04, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-
317/04 (accessed 2 August 2019); ECJ, Parliament v. Com-
mission, C-318/04, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf? 
language=en&num=C-318/04 (accessed 2 August 2019). 
42 Christopher Kuner, “A. Court of Justice International 
Agreements, Data Protection, and EU Fundamental Rights 
on the International Stage. Opinion 1/15, EU-Canada PNR”, 
Common Market Law Review 55, no. 3 (2018): 857–82. 
43 This is according to the so-called Safe Harbor Agree-
ment, which should oblige US companies to comply with 
data protection rules. Following its rejection by the CJEU, 
which did not provide for sufficient control rights for data 
subjects and data protection authorities, Safe Harbor was 
replaced by the Privacy Shield Agreement. The latter agree-
ment is also threatened with a negative assessment by the 
CJEU. See Jennifer Baker, “EU High Court Hearings to Deter-
mine Future of Privacy Shield, SCCs”, The Privacy Advisor 
(Portsmouth, NH), 25 June 2019, https://iapp.org/news/a/eu-
high-court-hearings-to-determine-future-of-privacy-shield-
standard-contractual-clauses/ (accessed 2 August 2019). 
44 Tuomas Ojanen, “Making the Essence of Fundamental 
Rights Real: The Court of Justice of the European Union Clari-
fies the Structure of Fundamental Rights under the Charter”, 
European Constitutional Law Review 12, no. 2 (2016): 318–29. 
possible to speak of a comparably ambitious role for 
the CJEU in the protection of fundamental rights.45 
The CJEU’s reluctance is particularly evident in the 
classification of the EU-Turkey deal of 2016. The CJEU 
rejected a complaint lodged by three asylum seekers 
against this agreement on purely formal grounds.46 
The applicants argued for the annulment of the EU-
Turkey deal because the return of refugees to Turkey 
would be accompanied by violations of fundamental 
rights. Furthermore, the applicants argued that such 
an international agreement should have been based 
on Articles 78 and 218 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU). This would have 
entailed the involvement of all EU institutions and 
would have allowed for a further review of the pro-
cedure, in accordance with existing EU legislation on 
the right to asylum and the requirement of non-
refoulement. In contrast, the CJEU relied on a narrow 
interpretation of its own jurisdiction and supported 
the interpretation of the EU member states: The 
agreement with Turkey had not been adopted collec-
tively by the European Council and was ultimately 
only an agreement between the individual govern-
ments and Turkey – therefore, it was not legally 
binding for the EU. Accordingly, the CJEU did not 
consider itself legally competent to review the agree-
ment.47 
 
45 This is noteworthy because the CJEU has taken a num-
ber of often controversial decisions on the intra-European 
interpretation of the Common European Asylum System. 
This applies, for example, to intra-European bans on depor-
tation under the rules of the Dublin regime because of the 
risk of inhumane treatment. For an overview, see Daniel 
Thym, “EuGH-Judikatur zum Migrationsrecht aus der Vogel-
perspektive (Teil 1)” [EuGH Judicature on Migration Law 
from a Bird’s Eye View, Part 1], Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und 
Ausländerpolitik 39, no. 1 (2019): 1–7; Daniel Thym, “EuGH-
Judikatur zum Migrationsrecht aus der Vogelperspektive 
(Teil 2)” [EuGH Judicature on Migration Law from a Bird’s 
Eye View, Part 2], Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländer-
politik 39, no. 2 (2019): 66–70. 
46 Roman Lehner, “The EU-Turkey-‘Deal’: Legal Challenges 
and Pitfalls”, International Migration 57, no. 2 (2019): 176–85. 
47 The CJEU confirmed this argumentation in a rejection of 
an appeal by the applications. See ECJ, Appeal – Article 181 
of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – EU-Tur-
key Statement of the European Council of 18 March 2016 – 
Application for Annulment. Joined Cases C-208/17 P to C-
210/17 P, 12 September 2018, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=205744&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=406469 
(accessed 2 August 2019). 
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However, this assessment was predominantly 
rejected by legal scholars,48 since the CJEU could well 
establish a competence under Union law, according 
to Article 4 (3) TEU and Article 3 (2) TFEU. These pro-
visions prohibit member states from concluding 
agreements with third countries that derogate from 
EU law.49 The return of irregular migrants is regulated 
by an EU directive, which member states must take 
into account in their external relations. In addition, a 
specific readmission agreement between the EU and 
Turkey has existed since 2014. The 2016 arrangement 
between Ankara and the member states for the read-
mission of “certain” applicants for protection should 
therefore have been covered by the existing readmis-
sion agreement – or at least should have been exam-
ined by the CJEU on the basis of the relevant EU 
instruments. 
One-third of the money for Turkey 
comes from the EU budget, that is €2 
billion out of a total of €6 billion. 
The EP’s involvement in the adoption of the more 
recent agreement with Turkey would also have been 
appropriate when looking at its substantive budgetary 
implications. After all, it was only after considerable 
financial assurances on the part of the EU that the so-
called deal was made possible, that is, €2 billion out 
of a total of €6 billion would be financed directly from 
the EU budget, and thus administered by the EU Com-
mission.50 The argument that this is a non-binding 
 
48 Paula G. Andrade, “The Duty of Cooperation in the Ex-
ternal Dimension of the EU Migration Policy”, in EU External 
Migration Policies in an Era of Global Mobilities: Intersecting Policy 
Universes, ed. Sergio Carrera (Leiden, 2018), 299–325; 
Thomas Spijkerboer, “Bifurcation of People, Bifurcation of 
Law: Externalization of Migration Policy before the EU Court 
of Justice”, Journal of Refugee Studies 31, no. 2 (2018): 216–39. 
49 See the so-called ERTA doctrine on the exclusive inter-
national competences of the Union derived from it, if it has 
adopted a corresponding internal legal regulation: ECJ, Com-
mission v. Council, 31 March 1971, C-22/70, http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?td=ALL&language=en&jur=C,T,F& 
num=22/70 (accessed 7 August 2019). See also Merijn 
Chamon, “Implied Exclusive Powers in the ECJ’s [European 
Court of Justice’s] Post-Lisbon Jurisprudence. The Continued 
Development of the ERTA Doctrine”, Common Market Law 
Review 55, no. 4 (2018): 1101–41. 
50 See on the structure of financing European Commis-
sion, The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Factsheet (see note 16). 
international arrangement is therefore highly ques-
tionable. 
The following example is comparable to the Turkey 
decision: At the height of the refugee crisis, the CJEU 
avoided a debate on the extraterritorial scope of Euro-
pean fundamental rights, in this case protection from 
torture and persecution.51 Specifically, a Syrian family 
filed a lawsuit against the Belgian government, which 
had rejected its application for a short-term visa on 
the grounds that a subsequent asylum application, 
and thus a long-term stay, were foreseeable. In order 
to comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, the Advocate General of the 
CJEU considered it necessary to issue humanitarian 
visas as an alternative. In contrast, the CJEU stated 
that the EU was not legally competent to issue long-
term residence permits and dismissed the lawsuit. 
Legal scholars increasingly share the view that the 
CJEU is reluctant to confront the member states when 
it comes to international migration policy. Because of 
this reserved role of the CJEU, the EU institutions and 
member states can currently refrain from legally 
binding EU agreements on migration control with 
third countries. Nevertheless, the EU’s political claim 
of upholding the rule of law still exists. For example, 
the Joint Way Forward deal for the coordination of 
return transfers to Afghanistan is accompanied by a 
commitment to comply with the relevant international 
law, the Geneva Convention, and the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union.52 According 
to the EU Commission, however, the document is not 
a binding agreement and not justiciable.53 It remains 
to be seen whether the CJEU will accept this informal-
isation of EU external relations in the future. 
 
51 Malu Beijer, “The Limited Scope for Accepting Positive 
Obligations under EU Law: The Case of Humanitarian Visas 
for Refugees”, Review of European Administrative Law 11, no. 1 
(2018): 37–48. 
52 European External Action Service, Joint Way Forward on 
Migration Issues between Afghanistan and the EU (Kabul, 2 Octo-
ber 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_ 
afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issues.pdf 
(accessed 27 May 2019). 
53 European External Action Service, Joint Way Forward 
on Migration Issues between Afghanistan and the EU (Kabul, 
2 October 2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_ 
afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issu es.pdf 
(accessed 27 May 2019). Scientific Research Service of the 
German Bundestag, questions on asylum and refugee pro-
tection against Afghan nationals, status WD 3 – 3000 – 
235/16 (Berlin, 2016). 
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International and Executive Tasks of 
Frontex and Europol 
When EU agencies for internal security act on an 
international level, the challenge is to ensure that 
cooperation with third countries on security issues is 
flexible on the one hand, and integrated into Euro-
pean law on the other. Pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, 
the CJEU monitors in principle all acts with legal 
effects vis-à-vis third parties54 that are issued by 
“other EU bodies”. This includes EU agencies.55 Two 
legal considerations are of particular importance for 
the international role of Europol and Frontex. First, 
according to the CJEU’s so-called Meroni Doctrine, EU 
agencies may exercise delegated competences derived 
from EU law only with a narrow margin of discretion. 
The extent to which this restriction applies to admin-
istrative arrangements or memorandums of under-
standing between agencies and third countries is 
debatable. Second, for Frontex the question arises as 
to whether the agency is directly liable in international 
operations with executive tasks. 
Europol has in the past been able to conclude 
autonomous cooperation agreements with “trust-
worthy” third countries.56 The EP successfully chal-
lenged this approach before the CJEU.57 The new 
Europol Regulation of 2017 addresses at least the 
exchange of personal data with third countries. It 
must be agreed through the regular procedure for EU 
international agreements (Article 218 TFEU), and all 
institutions must be involved. This arrangement is re-
 
54 The condition is that direct concern must be demon-
strated in order to establish the admissibility of an individual 
claim before the CJEU. 
55 The accountability of EU agencies is also ensured 
through administrative procedures, such as member states’ 
representatives on the Management Board, the European 
Ombudsman, the European Data Protection Supervisor, 
or the Frontex Human Rights Commissioner. See Mariana 
Gkliati, “The New European Border and Coast Guard: Do 
Increased Powers Come with Enhanced Accountability?”, 
EU Law Analysis (Blog), 17 April 2019, http://eulawanalysis. 
blogspot.com/2019/04/the-new-european-border-and-coast-
guard.html (accessed 27 May 2019). 
56 Florin Coman-Kund, “Europol’s International Coopera-
tion between ‘Past Present’ and ‘Present Future’: Reshaping 
the External Dimension of EU Police Cooperation”, Europe 
and the World: A Law Review 2, no. 1 (2018): 1–37. 
57 CJEU, Parliament v. Council, 10 September 2015, 
C-363/14, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-363/ 
14&language=EN (accessed 7 August 2019). 
levant, for example, to the current negotiations with 
the Maghreb countries, Jordan, and Israel. As Europol 
is bound by strict data protection requirements in 
its new legal basis, complementary legal supervision 
by the CJEU can be carried out. Therefore, the inter-
national activities of EU security agencies are already 
being regularly subject to close legal scrutiny. 
Frontex has concluded administrative 
agreements with many third 
countries. Their legal status 
is controversial. 
For more than 10 years, Frontex has concluded a 
growing number of administrative agreements with 
third countries in which only the EU Commission has 
been involved as negotiator. It is contested whether 
these agreements can legitimate the extent of Fron-
tex’s international cooperation on border security.58 
In concrete terms, this involves equipment assistance, 
training, or the ongoing exchange of information and 
findings on migration control with numerous third 
countries. Moreover, Frontex administrative agree-
ments do not refer uniformly to the applicable stand-
ards for refugee protection.59 Judicial supervision 
by the CJEU is therefore not ensured. However, the 
EP challenged some international practices of Frontex 
before the CJEU and obtained an independent EU 
legal basis for Frontex maritime surveillance opera-
tions.60 The resulting EU Regulation of 2014, for ex-
ample, explicitly affirms the principle of non-refoule-
ment of persons seeking protection.61 The general 
 
58 Florin Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as Global 
Actors: A Legal Study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Fron-
tex and Europol, Routledge Research in EU Law (Abingdon and 
New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), chapter 5; Melanie Fink, 
“Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human 
Rights Concerns Regarding ‘Technical Relationships’”, Utrecht 
Journal of International and European Law 28, no. 75 (2012):  
20–35. 
59 Chris Jones, Frontex: Cooperation with Non-EU states, 
Statewatch Briefing 309 (London, March 2017), http:// 
statewatch.org/analyses/no-309-frontex-third-countries-
agreements.pdf (accessed 28 May 2019). 
60 ECJ, Parliament v. Council, 5 September 2012, C-355/ 
10, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-355/10& 
language=EN (accessed 2 August 2019). 
61 European Union, Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Establishing 
Rules for the Surveillance of the External Sea Borders in the Context of 
Operational Cooperation Coordinated by the European Agency for the 
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Frontex Regulation of 2016 confirms this commit-
ment with regard to all international cooperation ar-
rangements.62 It should therefore be possible for the 
CJEU to review any potential exchange of information 
between Frontex and Libya.63 For example, it would 
be particularly sensitive if Frontex were to transmit 
operational maritime surveillance data to Libyan 
forces, with the result that refugees would be returned 
to camps where they are threatened with serious ill-
treatment.64 
In principle, EU member states are responsible for 
ensuring internal security and public order65 and can 
usually only be assisted by EU agencies. As a result, 
only seconded officials from the member states are 
currently able to carry out executive tasks in Frontex 
missions. In the event of unlawful treatment of per-
sons seeking protection, the EU state in command 
may be held responsible.66 In addition, officials sec-
onded to Frontex missions are supervised by their 
home state.67 
 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the Member States of the European Union, (Brussels, 15 May 2014), 
preamble, paragraphs. 5, 12–16. 
62 European Union, Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 (see note 18), 
preamble, paragraph 46. 
63 In the framework of the so-called Seahorse network. See 
Markus Sehl, “Libyen als Türsteher für Flüchtlingsboote im 
Mittelmeer?” [Libya as a Doorman for Refugee Boats in the 
Mediterranean?], LTO.de – Legal Tribune Online – Aktuelles aus 
Recht und Justiz (Cologne, 6 December 2018), https://www.lto. 
de/recht/hintergruende/h/seepferdchen-mittelmeer-
ueberwachung-grenze-libyen-europa-eurosur-eu/ (accessed 
28 May 2019). 
64 This accusation is already made in an application before 
the International Criminal Court in The Hague. See the ex-
planations in chapter 3, page 26ff. 
65 Article 4 (2) TEU, Article 72 TFEU. 
66 For this purpose, the respective national law would 
first be applied and, after exhaustion of all legal means of 
recourse, also decided on the basis of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. See Melanie Fink, Frontex and Human 
Rights. Responsibility in ‘Multi-Actor Situations’ under the ECHR 
[European Convention on Human Rights] and EU Public Liability Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
67 A total liability of Frontex currently arises only in the 
hypothetical event that EU deployment plans would system-
atically violate fundamental rights and this would be de-
monstrable. The complaints system set up with the Frontex 
internal human rights commissioner does not provide for 
any concrete legal consequences. 
By 2027, Frontex is expected to build 
up an operational reserve of 10,000 
border guards, consisting of EU 
officials and member states’ forces. 
The recent reform of the Frontex Regulation68 
that was politically agreed in April 2019 poses a new 
challenge: an increasingly autonomous operational 
reserve of 10,000 border guards is to be created by 
2027, consisting only in part of seconded forces of the 
member states. Rather, Frontex is to recruit its own 
officials. These EU border guards would, together 
with national officials, carry out executive tasks such 
as checks on persons.69 It is therefore logical that 
Frontex should be directly liable for any damage 
that may result from the actions of its own officials.70 
Already today, Frontex missions assume executive 
tasks in border security in the Western Balkans.71 In 
the future, such missions could be deployed on the 
African continent.72 The status agreements of Frontex 
missions are based on the model of the CSDP with 
extensive local immunity from prosecution. Neverthe-
less, the CJEU could be responsible for investigating 
the conduct of Frontex officials in actions for dam-
ages brought by third-country nationals. This may 
concern specific security measures such as the pro-
portionality of controls on persons or compliance 
with the principle of non-refoulement. The executive 
action of EU agencies should be clearly regulated and 
predictable for external actors. 
 
68 European Parliament, European Parliament Legislative Reso-
lution of 17 April 2019 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and 
Coast Guard and Repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regu-
lation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council (COM(2018)0631 – C8-0406/2018 – 2018/ 
0330A(COD)) (Strasbourg, 17 April 2019), http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0415_EN.html?redirect 
(accessed 23 August 2019). 
69 Ibid., Articles 56, 83. 
70 Ibid., Articles 85, 86, 96, and 96a. 
71 Albania has been involved in such activities since the 
spring of 2019, while expansion is planned in northern 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. See “Fron-
tex Gets Ready to Deploy to the Balkans”, Statewatch News 
(London), 9 May 2019, http://statewatch.org/news/2019/may/ 
eu-frontex-balkans.htm (accessed 28 May 2019). 
72 However, the deployment of such missions should 
be made dependent on the Commission’s assessment of 
the human rights situation in the country concerned. 
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Executive Freedom and Individual 
Legal Protection in the CFSP 
The CJEU has actively fought to obtain a role in the 
CFSP. With regard to decisions on EU sanctions, 
the Lisbon Treaty has given the CJEU the competence 
to ensure compliance with formal legal guarantees 
for affected individuals. However, the core area of 
executive responsibility of the member states for po-
litical decisions or the deployment of CSDP missions 
remains exempt from judicial scrutiny. This also ap-
plies to international operations with mixed objec-
tives for the internal and external security of the EU. 
This partial supervision of the CFSP by the CJEU is 
the result of many years of negotiation. In 2008, the 
CJEU issued a judgement that initially called the EU’s 
claim for an integrated foreign and security policy into 
question.73 The Council of Ministers had authorized 
financial support for the Economic Community of West 
African States through a CFSP decision to limit the 
proliferation of small arms. According to the CJEU’s 
ruling, this grant had disregarded the EU Commission’s 
Community competences in development policy. 
Shortly afterwards, in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty stipu-
lated that the CJEU could review the demarcation 
between the CFSP and the CSDP and other EU policy 
areas (Article 40 TEU). This defused the fundamental 
conflict over the danger of an extension of the 
intergovernmental regime of the CFSP to com-
munitarised EU policy areas. This guarantee made the 
CJEU much more flexible towards the political inter-
ests of the member states. 
For example, the CJEU decided in 2014 and 2016 in 
two consecutive proceedings that the EU’s commitment 
to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa could be solely 
based on the provisions of the CFSP and the CSDP. 
This applies even if the CSDP missions’ activities in-
clude the arrest and transfer of individuals to African 
states, which would initiate further legal proceedings 
for acts of piracy.74 A legal basis for criminal law co-
 
73 Steven Blockmans and Martina Spernbauer, “Legal Ob-
stacles to Comprehensive EU External Security Action”, Euro-
pean Foreign Affairs Review 18, no. 4 (2013): 7–24. 
74 ECJ, Parliament v. Council, 24 June 2014, C-658/11, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=c-
658/11 (accessed 2 August 2019); ECJ, Parliament v. Council, 
14 June 2016, C-263/14, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf? 
language=en&num=C-263/14 (accessed 2 August 2019); Peter 
van Elsuwege, “Securing the Institutional Balance in the Pro-
cedure for Concluding International Agreements: European 
Parliament v. Council (Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mau-
operation (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
Title V TFEU) is not necessary for this type of external 
action of the EU.75 More generally: The CJEU assumes 
that the CSDP can serve as the legal “centre of gravity”. 
Further measures can be linked to this centre of grav-
ity for the EU’s international security missions. It is, 
hence, legitimate to embed instruments for internal 
security within the legal framework of the CFSP/CSDP. 
However, a review of the actual conduct of CSDP 
missions does not fall within the competence of the 
CJEU. The forces involved are only indirectly respon-
sible, namely through the jurisdiction and fundamen-
tal rights compliance of the posting EU member 
states. Some jurists consider this to be problematic76 
because the agreements of the respective CSDP mis-
sions provide for immunity from local jurisdiction in 
addition to there being only limited possibilities for 
administrative complaints.77 In this respect, the EU’s 
handling of its missions is no different than the UN’s 
handling of its own. 
 
ritius)”, Common Market Law Review 52, no. 5 (2015): 1379–98; 
Efthymios Papastavridis, “EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta off 
Somalia: The EU in Unchartered Legal Waters?”, International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly 64, no. 3 (2015): 533–68. 
75 This line of argument of the CJEU remains contested by 
legal scholars. See Mauro Gatti, “Conflict of Legal Bases and 
the Internal-External Security Nexus: AFSJ [Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice] versus CFSP [Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy]”, in Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations Law, 
ed. Eleftheria Neframi and Mauro Gatti, Luxemburger Juris-
tische Studien, vol. 16, first edition (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2018), 89–110. 
76 Stian Ø. Johansen, “Accountability Mechanisms for 
Human Rights Violations by CSDP [Common Security and 
Defence Policy] Missions: Available and Sufficient?”, Inter-
national & Comparative Law Quarterly 66, no. 1 (2017): 181–
207; Joni Heliskoski, “Responsibility and Liability for CSDP 
Operations”, in Research Handbook on the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, ed. Steven Blockmans et al., Research 
Handbooks in European Law (Cheltenham and Northamp-
ton, MA, 2018), 132–53. 
77 The CJEU has spoken law on administrative and finan-
cial issues of EU missions abroad (CSDP). The court declared 
itself responsible for the review of the awarding of contracts 
by the Head of Mission of EULEX Kosovo and, in a personnel 
dispute, for a transfer to the CSDP mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
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In sanctions policy, the CJEU has 
reaffirmed the autonomy of the 
EU legal order. 
EU sanctions policy is an example of how higher 
constitutional and legal requirements for EU foreign 
policy can give it greater international weight. As 
far as sanctions policy is concerned, the CJEU has re-
inforced the autonomy of the EU legal order and the 
fundamental right to a legal remedy and a fair trial.78 
Since the mid-2000s, the EU has imposed sanctions 
under the CFSP to combat international terrorism. Ac-
cording to several CJEU judgments in 2008 and 2013 
on the Kadi and Al Barakaat cases,79 there must be 
public justification for the sanctions decision so as to 
allow for a legal review.80 In a second decision on this 
case in 2013, the CJEU confirmed that minimum stand-
ards for legal recourse are necessary – this decision 
even prompted changes in the UN sanctions regime.81 
 
78 Allan Rosas, “EU Sanctions, Security Concerns and 
Judicial Control”, in Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations 
Law, ed. Neframi and Gatti (see note 75), 307–18; Graham 
Butler, “Implementing a Complete System of Legal Remedies 
in EU Foreign Affairs Law”, Columbia Journal of European Law 
24, no. 3 (2018): 637–76. 
79 ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission, 3 September 2008, C-402/05 P, http:// 
curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-402/05 (ac-
cessed 7 August 2019); ECJ, Al Barakaat International Foun-
dation v. Council and Commission, C-415/05 P, http://curia. 
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-415/05% 20P 
(accessed 7 August 2019); ECJ, Revision Commission and 
Others v. Kadi, 18 July 2013, C-584/10 P, http://curia.europa.eu/ 
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-584/10% 20P (accessed 
7 August 2019). 
80 The possibility of a challenge must also be provided 
where confidential or proprietary information justifies the 
sanction decision. See Alice Riccardi, “Revisiting the Role 
of the EU Judiciary As the Stronghold for the Protection of 
Human Rights While Countering Terrorism”, Global Jurist 18, 
no. 2 (2018) (online only), doi: 10.1515/gj-2018-0019. 
81 Accordingly, data subjects can lodge complaints with 
an ombudsperson; furthermore, the entire decision-making 
process on sanctions has been structured more clearly. See 
Devika Hovell, “Kadi: King-Slayer or King-Maker? The Shift-
ing Allocation of Decision-Making Power between the UN 
Security Council and Courts”, The Modern Law Review 79, no. 1 
(2016): 147–66; Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig, Counter-Terrorist 
Sanctions Regimes. Legal Framework and Challenges at UN and EU 
Levels, Briefing (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research 
Service, October 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/589864/EPRS_BRI(2016)589864_EN.
pdf (accessed 2 August 2019). 
The Lisbon Treaty already consolidated the CJEU’s 
position in 2009: Article 275 TFEU allows the CJEU 
to examine the legality of decisions on restrictive 
measures against natural or legal persons in the CFSP 
area. This judicial competence underscores the EU’s 
foreign policy capacity to act on sanctions policy.82 
In 2017, in the wake of the Rosneft case, the CJEU 
confirmed that it could review national legislation 
implementing EU sanctions in a comparable way.83 
The Union’s fundamental decision to sanction Russia 
for its actions in the Crimea, however, remains out-
side the control of the judiciary and is the political 
responsibility of the CFSP. 
As part of the increasing political focus on border 
security, so-called targeted EU sanctions (smart sanc-
tions) against human trafficking are becoming more 
attractive. This development could trigger further 
judicial reviews of procedural safeguards and rem-
edies for affected individuals. In June 2018, for the 
first time, the EU sanctioned six Libyan citizens for 
their involvement in human trafficking, pursuant to 
a UN decision.84 At the initiative of the Netherlands, 
the introduction of Qualified Majority Decisions has 
been under discussion since the end of 2018 in order 
to make it easier to decide on individual sanctions for 
human rights violations in the future.85 
 
 
82 Guy Harpaz, “Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
Counter-Terrorism Measures and Judicial Review: Hamas and 
LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]”, Common Market Law 
Review 55, no. 6 (2018): 1917–40. 
83 Under the regular preliminary procedure by national 
courts. See Sara Poli, “The Common Foreign Security Policy 
after Rosneft: Still Imperfect but Gradually Subject to the 
Rule of Law”, Common Market Law Review 54, no. 6 (2017): 
1799–1834. 
84 Council of the European Union, “Fight against Human 
Trafficking in Libya: EU Sanctions Six Human Traffickers and 
Smugglers in Line with UN Decision”, Press Release (Brussels, 
14 June 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/ 
press-releases/2018/06/14/fight-against-human-trafficking-in-
libya-eu-sanctions-six-human-traffickers-and-smugglers-in-
line-with-un-decision/ (accessed 27 May 2019). 
85 Christina Eckes, “EU Sanctions Regime Cannot Be 
an ‘EU Magnitsky Act’”, EuOberserver, 24 May 2019, https:// 
euobserver.com/opinion/144968 (accessed 27 May 2019); 
European Parliament Resolution of 14 March 2019 on a European 
Human Rights Violations Sanctions Regime (2019/2580(RSP)) (Stras-
bourg, 14 March 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0215_EN.html?redirect (accessed 
27 May 2019). 
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The CJEU’s oversight role of the EU’s external action 
has been significantly strengthened in recent years. 
Nevertheless, there is no clear legal responsibility for 
operational measures in the CFSP/CSDP, while the 
external role of EU agencies for internal security con-
tinues to grow. The coherence of EU external action 
and the European legal order is under pressure. The 
CJEU is reluctant to challenge controversial policies of 
the member states, as in the case of the informal EU-
Turkey deal. The judicial review and scrutiny of EU 
foreign and security policy cannot be done through 
EU law alone. 
The European Court of Human Rights 
can examine all actions of the contract-
ing states to determine whether fun-
damental rights are being observed. 
For human rights violations in the southern Medi-
terranean, the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg or the ICC in The Hague could hold indi-
vidual member states and the EU accountable. The 
ECtHR can exercise far-reaching control over funda-
mental rights vis-à-vis the contracting states, provided 
that national legal remedies have been exhausted. 
The following norms have to be respected in border 
and migration control: 
1. the prohibition of inhumane treatment,86 
2. the right to personal freedom,87 
3. the protection against the undue rejection of 
persons seeking protection (non-refoulement),88 
4. the right to an effective remedy.89 
 
86 Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. 
87 Article 5 ECHR and Article 6 Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. 
88 Article 3 ECHR; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union Article 19 and the further-reaching right 
to asylum set out in Article 18. 
These and other human rights obligations of the 
European Convention on Human Rights are also en-
shrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and are therefore binding on the EU 
institutions.90 The ECtHR, on the other hand, regu-
larly criticises the maltreatment of persons seeking 
protection at the EU’s external borders or in border 
areas. The rejection of irregular migrants is not 
allowed without having examined any potential indi-
vidual claims for asylum and protection.91 
The EU itself has not yet acceded to the ECHR and 
is currently not empowered to ensure the implemen-
tation of such judgments by the contracting states. 
The ECtHR therefore remains responsible for in-
dependent judicial control over European security 
authorities. In addition, the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the ECHR has recently become a challenge for 
 
89 Article 13 ECHR and Article 47 Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. 
90 See Article 52 (3) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. The content coverage with the ECHR justi-
fies the so-called Bosphorus assumption of the ECHR, accord-
ing to which government action under EU legal obligations 
can generally be regarded as complying with fundamental 
rights. See Nikolaos Lavranos, “Das So-Lange-Prinzip im Ver-
hältnis von ECHR und EuGH – Anmerkung zum Urteil des 
ECHR v. 30.06.2005, Rs. 45036/98” [The So-Lange Principle in 
the Relationship between ECHR and CJEU – Comment on 
the ECtHR Decision of 30.06.2005, Case 45036/98], EuR Europa-
recht 41, no. 1 (2006): 79–92. 
91 For example ECtHR, M. A. and Others v. Lithuania, 11 
December 2018, Application No. 59793/17, http://hudoc.echr. 
coe.int/eng?i=001-188267 (accessed 8 August 2019); ECtHR, 
N. D. and N. T. v. Spain, 3 October 2017, Application Nos. 
8675/15 and 8697/15, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
177683 (accessed 8 August 2019); The Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, European Court of Human Rights Orders Hungarian 
Government to Give Food to Detained Migrants in Eighth Emergency 
Case, Budapest, 19 March 2019, https://www.helsinki.hu/en/ 
echr_eighth_interim_measure_denial_of_food/ (accessed 
27 May 2019). 
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European foreign and security policy. In 2012, the 
ECtHR issued a ruling in a case against Italy that 
is decisive for externalised practices of migration 
control: the so-called Hirsi ruling, which prohibits 
European authorities from directly refusing refugees 
at sea.92 In May 2018, another case was brought 
against Italy for its support of the Libyan Coast 
Guard.93 A condemnation of Italy would also directly 
question the EU’s credibility and co-responsibility 
in Libya. The accusation of direct responsibility for 
crimes against humanity in the EU’s border security 
policy was also brought before the ICC in June 2019. 
If the prosecutor were to open an official investiga-
tion before the ICC, individual criminal liability of 
government officials in the EU would be conceivable 
for the first time. 
The Extraterritorial Expansion of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
The CJEU bases its jurisdiction on the competences 
set out in the EU treaties, which can vary across 
policy areas. This explains the CFSP’s special regime, 
for example. The jurisdiction of the ECtHR, on the 
other hand, is not subject to any sector-specific re-
strictions. The ECtHR has general jurisdiction, pro-
vided that all other remedies have been exhausted to 
bring an action for infringement of a fundamental 
right. For the admissibility of a claim before the 
ECtHR, however, the territorial scope of application 
of the ECHR to its contracting states must also be 
established.94 Over time, the ECtHR has extended the 
validity of the ECHR to extraterritorial constellations 
in numerous judgments.95 In the early 2000s, the 
 
92 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 23 February 
2012, Application No. 27765/09, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-109231 (accessed 8 August 2019). 
93 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Case against 
Italy before the European Court of Human Rights Will Raise Issue 
of Cooperation with Libyan Coast Guard (Brussels, 18 May 2018), 
https://www.ecre.org/case-against-italy-before-the-european-
court-of-human-rights-will-raise-issue-of-cooperation-with-
libyan-coast-guard/ (accessed 27 May 2019). 
94 The CJEU, on the other hand, is less territorial and 
derives an extraterritorial application of EU law for func-
tional or dogmatic reasons. 
95 ECtHR, Extra-territorial Jurisdiction of States Parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Factsheet (Strasbourg, 
July 2018), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Extra-
territorial_jurisdiction_ENG.pdf (accessed 27 May 2019). 
ECtHR still refused to apply the ECHR directly to the 
behaviour of European states in the military conflicts 
in the Balkans.96 This changed in the course of the 
fight against international terrorism. For example, in 
2011 the United Kingdom was held responsible for 
the deaths of arrested Iraqi citizens, as it was acting as 
an occupying power with full responsibility for ensur-
ing public safety in Basra.97 
The ECtHR decided in further cases under which 
circumstances “effective” control could trigger the 
extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR vis-à-vis its 
contracting states. For example, the ECtHR interpret-
ed the interception of a foreign ship on the high seas 
by the French military as a comparable situation of 
sovereign power – consequently, France was called 
to account.98 
Hirsi ruling: Italy should not have 
sent irregular migrants back to 
Libya without examining their 
claims for asylum. 
In the Hirsi case, the ECtHR ruled in 2012 that all 
relevant fundamental rights of the ECHR should be 
guaranteed to ship occupants, even if a ship is only 
temporarily taken over by officials of a contracting 
state.99 This also applies to the right to asylum. Italy 
should not have immediately returned irregular 
migrants to Libya without first examining their indi-
vidual asylum applications. This obligation applies 
above all because effective humanitarian protection 
does not exist in Libya and these persons are threat-
ened with inhumane treatment. The ECtHR defined 
in this precedent the extraterritorial validity of the 
principle of non-refoulement of persons seeking pro-
tection and the prohibition of collective expulsions.100 
 
96 ECtHR, Banković and Others v. Belgium & 16 Other 
Contracting States, 12 December 2001, Application 
No. 52207/99, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-22099 
(accessed 8 August 2019). 
97 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 
7 July 2011, Application No. 55721/07, http://hudoc.echr.coe. 
int/eng?i=001-105606 (accessed 8 August 2019). 
98 ECtHR, Medvedyev and Others v. France, 29 March 2010, 
Application No. 3394/03, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
97979 (accessed 8 August 2019). 
99 Maarten den Heijer, “Reflections on Refoulement and Col-
lective Expulsion in the Hirsi Case”, International Journal of 
Refugee Law 25, no. 2 (2013): 265–90. 
100 ECHR, Guide on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Prohibition of Collective Expulsions of 
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Extended Responsibility: 
Italy As a Litmus Test 
The current question is: Can compliance with the re-
quirement of non-refoulement be demanded even if 
a) no forces from ECHR contracting states are directly 
or physically involved – as, for example, in the take-
over of a foreign ship – and/or b) no clear effective 
control by ECHR contracting states can be demon-
strated?101 In May 2018, a complaint was filed with 
the ECtHR to review this constellation of extraterrito-
rial applicability of the ECHR with regard to more 
indirect support for actions by Libyan forces.102 This 
specific case concerns a tragic rescue operation in 
which several people drowned and private NGOs 
such as Sea-Watch and the Libyan Coast Guard were 
present. Although Italian military personnel were not 
directly involved in the confrontation at sea, they 
allegedly gave instructions to the Libyan Coast Guard 
from a military helicopter circling overhead. Legally, 
therefore, a “situational effective control” could be 
given.103 Furthermore, the Libyan Coast Guard is 
only operational due to material and tactical support 
from Italy. This can facilitate the attribution of legal 
responsibility to Italy. The judgement will largely 
depend on whether the ECtHR falls back on the pro-
visions of the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) of the Inter-
national Law Commission (ILC) of 2001.104 In some 
 
Aliens (Strasbourg, 30 April 2019), https://www.echr.coe.int/ 
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Drown”, New York Times, 26 December 2018, https://www. 
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cases, the ECtHR has used this elaboration of inter-
national state responsibility as a basis for its legal 
argumentation (opinio juris).105 
On this basis, many jurists argue that106 Italy 
should be held liable for its support of the Libyan 
Coast Guard. In general, according to Article 16 (alter-
natively Article 17) and Article 41 of the ARSIWA, 
the principle applies: A state may not indirectly allow 
a third state to do what it is legally prohibited from 
doing itself. Italy is bound by the following standards: 
Compliance with the right to leave a country; uni-
versal prohibition of torture; provisions of interna-
tional maritime law. If Libyan forces regularly violate 
these norms, Italy is not legally authorised to support 
them. However, it must be shown that the aiding and 
abetting of a breach of law in a third country was 
actually intended or was a clearly foreseeable conse-
quence of the aid provided. In the case of Italian and 
European support for Libyan security forces, this may 
well be the case.107 
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Externalizing-migration-control_MORENO-LEMBERG_FIN-
mod.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019). 
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The Libyan authorities are dependent 
on external aid – so is Europe 
indirectly responsible for human 
rights violations? 
The Libyan Coast Guard is dependent on external 
support, such as the supply of patrol boats. These 
boats are directly involved in picking up people in the 
Mediterranean. They are often transferred to camps 
or prisons where they face serious human rights vio-
lations. The scope of Italian aid to Libyan forces is 
set out in a memorandum of understanding from 
2017,108 which may facilitate evidence of intentional 
action and aid to human rights abuses.109 According 
to the memorandum of understanding, Italy provides 
extensive equipment and training assistance that is 
co-financed by the EU110 and exchanges operational 
information with the Libyan Coast Guard.111 In sum, 
the Libyan Coast Guard can only act with the help of 
Italy and the EU to the extent it has done since 2018. 
Even if this European assistance can also contribute 
to sea rescues, it is to be expected that those seeking 
protection will suffer ill-treatment after their repat-
riation. 
If the ECtHR condemns Italy, the question is un-
avoidable as to whether the EU has also violated the 
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ban on inhumane treatment and the principle of 
non-refoulement (Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR). The 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organi-
zations (ARIO)112 of the ILC of 2011 are largely analo-
gous to the ARSIWA of 2001 on extended state re-
sponsibility. In the case of ARIO, the ILC has paid 
particular attention to the role of the EU.113 In par-
ticular, Articles 14 and 58 of ARIO, which prohibit 
aiding or abetting illegal activities, could apply to the 
case of EU support to Libya. Accordingly, the CSDP 
operation “Sophia” and the mission EUBAM Libya as 
well as financial assistance from the EU could have 
abetted fundamental rights violations, especially 
where Libyan Coast Guard forces are trained and em-
powered. If the EU were to be declared jointly liable, 
this would set a precedent of high relevance for the 
entire EU foreign and security policy.114 
The Risk of an Investigation by the 
International Criminal Court 
In June 2019, two experts in international law elabo-
rated on the accusation of a pan-European respon-
sibility for serious human rights violations in Libya 
on another legal basis, namely the Rome Statute of 
the ICC.115 The authors refer to critical statements by 
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274. 
115 They have submitted their reasons to the ICC in a more 
than 200-page document. See Omer Shatz and Juan Branco, 
EU Migration Policies in the Central Mediterranean and Libya 
(2014–2019). Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court Pursuant to the Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute (The Hague, 2019), https://www.statewatch.org/news/ 
2019/jun/eu-icc-case-EU-Migration-Policies.pdf (accessed 
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a prosecutor at the ICC on the situation of migrants 
in Libya and to the direct request by two UN Special 
Rapporteurs to initiate proceedings in The Hague.116 
In order to promote this process, the international 
lawyers are trying to demonstrate, using publicly 
available sources, that the EU is pursuing a systematic 
policy of deterrence on the central Mediterranean 
route and is consciously accepting an increased risk 
of death for those seeking protection. In addition, in 
numerous individual cases, Italian authorities and 
European officials had passed on information to the 
Libyan Coast Guard to pick up boats carrying 
refugees.117 
Decision-makers must answer 
personally to the International 
Criminal Court. 
As in the ECHR, the assumption of “effective con-
trol” over Libyan forces and waters is the basis of ICC 
jurisdiction.118 Furthermore, failure to provide assis-
tance in the event of serious human rights violations 
or crimes against humanity pursuant to Articles 6 to 
8 of the Rome Statute could result in criminal pen-
alties.119 Whereas states have to answer to the ECtHR, 
decision-makers would have a personal responsibility 
before the ICC. This also applies to cases of substan-
tial aiding and abetting of criminal offences by third 
parties.120 
The EU has committed itself to cooperation with 
the ICC and counts as an independent legal entity.121 
No proceedings for crimes against humanity in Libya 
have so far been brought forward in the national 
courts. The supplementary competence of the ICC 
could thus come into play, according to the two 
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116 Ibid., 10ff. There is also the openly formulated UN 
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tance. OJ L 115 of 28/04/2006, Brussels, 28 April 2006. 
experts in international law. The intervention of this 
court would even be imperative, since the alleged 
crimes are to have been committed systematically 
over several years and the seriousness of the offences 
to be sufficient.122 Moreover, the legitimacy of the ICC 
would be undermined if prominent European actors 
were not investigated for political reasons and ex-
pediency.123 
The application of the legal provisions of an “attack” 
and of a “violent expulsion”, according to Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute, requires a plausibility check in the 
present case.124 Yet, it is undisputed that irregular 
migrants in Libya regularly become victims of crimes 
against humanity and that these are committed with 
the knowledge of the EU.125 An examination of Euro-
pean migration policy by the ICC’s prosecutors ap-
pears, hence, possible and would force the EU to clarify 
its position on externalised migration controls. 
The Difficult Relationship between the EU 
and the ECtHR 
It may take several years for the ECtHR, and possibly 
the ICC, to conclusively assess the allegations about 
what is happening in Libya. An active policy to con-
solidate the constitutional dimension of European 
foreign and security policy is already necessary in 
advance. 
The EU should resume its accession to the ECHR 
in order to strengthen the legitimacy of European for-
eign and security policy on a structural level. The EU 
Commission announced this step in July 2019 in a 
communication on the rule of law in Europe.126 Ac-
cession to the ECHR would make it possible to draw 
the constitutional boundaries of EU foreign and secu-
rity policy more clearly. Questionable EU practices 
concerning border security measures in third coun-
tries and the unresolved responsibility for sea rescues 
could be reviewed along the core European legal 
requirements for the protection of human rights. The 
CJEU’s lack of supervisory competence over the CFSP 
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and the CSDP could be reliably taken over by ECtHR. 
Accordingly, the controversial EU operation “Sophia” 
could be assessed in a new light and reformed, where-
as the operational support for the Libyan Coast Guard 
would in all likelihood be ruled out under current 
circumstances. 
For formal accession of the EU to the ECHR, as pro-
vided for in Article 6 (2) TEU, intra-European legal 
conflicts must be resolved. From the dogmatic point 
of view of the CJEU, the overarching supervisory role 
of the ECtHR in the protection of human rights is 
problematic. In general, the CJEU underlines its con-
stitutional and normative autonomy in order to un-
derpin the independent standing of the EU legal order 
both within Europe and internationally.127 The CJEU 
stresses its formal harmonisation function, that is, 
that all its decisions are based on the supremacy 
of European law and are applicable to all member 
states. This does not apply to the ECtHR with its case-
specific judgements. From this perspective of the 
CJEU, EU accession to the ECHR is therefore excluded 
as long as the CJEU itself cannot exercise full juris-
diction over the CFSP/CSDP.128 This is one of the 
reasons why the CJEU rejected an already formulated 
agreement on EU accession to the ECHR in 2014.129 
The erroneous conclusion that EU accession to the 
ECHR is therefore blocked can be rejected not only for 
political but also for legal reasons.130 It is difficult, for 
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example, to use the so-called Foto-Frost doctrine131 
for the CFSP/CSDP, according to which, for reasons 
of consistency of the European legal framework, the 
CJEU alone may judge the legality of Union acts. On 
the contrary, national courts, in cooperation with the 
CJEU, could ensure a sufficiently uniform protection 
of fundamental rights for the CFSP/CSDP.132 The reason 
for this is that the CFSP/CSDP do not issue directly 
legally binding EU regulations and directives, but pri-
marily political decisions. The CJEU case law on sanc-
tions –especially in the Rosneft case – shows that 
such cooperation is a viable way forward.133 In this 
case, individual legal review was granted through 
national courts. The well-known reservations of the 
CJEU could therefore be dispelled by a future EU ac-
cession agreement to the ECHR134 being structured 
differently from the first one, which was rejected. The 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR and the asso-
ciated overcoming of the special status of the CFSP/ 
CSDP could largely close the gaps in fundamental 
rights control under EU law. 
The EU relies on multilateralism in its 
external action. It is the central 
principle and legitimation. 
If the EU’s accession to the ECHR were categorically 
rejected, the political credibility and effectiveness of 
the EU’s foreign and security policy would be severely 
damaged. The EU itself is essentially the result of a 
multilateral negotiation process and is committed to 
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this guiding principle in its external action. This 
promise to act multilaterally legitimises the Union’s 
action precisely in contrast to the classical power 
politics of individual states. If the EU were to dis-
regard its own treaty obligations for the compre-
hensive protection of fundamental rights, it and its 
member states would sow doubts as to whether they 
are still willing to strengthen multilateralism and 
international law. The EU as an international actor 
and supranational organisation sui generis legitimises 
itself through its CFSP and its CSDP: Both take place 
beyond classical member state foreign and security 
policy on the one hand, and NATO as an alliance of 
collective defence on the other. Inter-institutional 
complementarity in foreign, security, and defence 
policy is based on the avoidance of double struc-
tures – and this is what makes an effective Euro-
pean security policy possible in the first place. 
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Western states such as the United States and Australia 
weaken multilateralism and the validity of inter-
national law by withdrawing from international con-
ventions and agreements, in particular on refugee 
protection. When large democracies call existing 
international legal principles into question, it be-
comes all the more difficult to promote duties of due 
diligence globally or even to counter a further dis-
solution of international law. Here the EU can make a 
constructive contribution, despite the criticism of its 
questionable practices of externalised border security. 
The role of the CJEU, the ECtHR, and the national 
courts in Europe has changed; in principle, their im-
portance for a European foreign and security policy 
based on the rule of law has noticeably increased in 
recent years. At the latest with the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty, a strong legalisation of EU external 
relations was established. Examples are the creation 
of an international legal personality for the EU and 
the general applicability of the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights to Union action. 
Integration into the EU legal framework and con-
trol by the CJEU need not necessarily weaken the 
enforcement of European security interests. In a 
number of judgments, the CJEU has shown a balance 
between the protection of individual fundamental 
rights on the one hand, and the necessary security 
measures of the EU on the other. This is primarily 
evident in the case of individual sanctions. Here the 
EU has successfully introduced a controversial but 
nevertheless sound procedure to combat the financ-
ing of terrorism. The EU anti-piracy missions have 
illustrated how internal and external security objec-
tives can be legally anchored and linked within the 
framework of the CSDP. An effective EU refugee and 
migration policy begins with externalised migration 
control in countries of origin and transit – and ends 
where legal migration routes to the EU are opened. 
Currently, there is a political demand to treat sea 
rescue as an essential part of European refugee and 
migration policy again. Ethically, this would be neces-
sary, but it presupposes the willingness of Europeans 
to share the burden. In contrast, the question of the 
appropriate legal basis in the EU treaties to underpin 
such an effort is secondary. 
EU agencies for internal security are likely to co-
operate even more closely with third countries or 
regional organisations in the future. With regard to 
Frontex operations, many aspects of legal responsibil-
ity still need to be clarified – especially when EU 
border guards are deployed for sovereign tasks. Never-
theless, there is no question that the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights is binding in principle and that 
secondary EU law on the protection of refugees is 
valid also in international contexts. Pushing border 
security measures beyond the EU and fighting human 
trafficking on an international level does not neces-
sarily have to fall within the scope of classical foreign 
policy, with the associated political and military room 
for manoeuvre. Conversely, the controversy on the 
direction of the EU operation “Sophia” shows that 
CSDP missions, which are based on specific mandates 
with few connections to the rest of the EU’s legal 
framework, have trouble striking a balance between 
the protection of human rights and operational bor-
der security measures. In any case, it should be borne 
in mind that specific measures taken in the course of 
a CSDP missions can only be controlled very indirectly 
through the national courts of those member states 
that send officers. 
Moreover, the EU and the CJEU do not yet have 
the legal competence or the ambition to clarify the 
legal grey zones that have emerged due to the increas-
ing links between internal and external security. 
Although the CJEU has shown itself to be very ambi-
tious in its judgments on data protection, including 
with extraterritorial effects, it has declared itself to be 
not competent with regard to the EU-Turkey deal and 
humanitarian visas. It remains open whether the 
CJEU can and will limit the informalisation of Euro-
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pean agreements with third countries for border and 
migration control purposes. 
In contrast, the ECtHR determines the scope of its 
jurisdiction primarily through territoriality and is not 
bound by any specific legal form or state action. For 
example, the ECtHR has condemned many informal 
border control practices at the EU’s external borders, 
such as the “pushbacks” and “hot returns”, i.e. im-
mediate rejection, of persons seeking protection in 
border areas. Moreover, the ECtHR extends its case 
law and applicability of the ECHR to situations where 
a contracting state exercises “effective control” beyond 
its territory. According to the groundbreaking Hirsi 
ruling, the direct involvement of the authorities of 
European member states in border management 
practices has so far been crucial in extraterritorial 
order to prosecute human rights violations or vio-
lations of international refugee law. 
Whether the ECtHR will condemn Italian support 
for the Libyan Coast Guard by resorting to an extended 
interpretation of state responsibility remains to be 
seen. This would set a far-reaching precedent for the 
legitimacy of European security cooperation with 
third countries. The EU is also being threatened with 
an investigation before the ICC, which would be ac-
companied by a legal assessment of the EU’s refugee 
and migration policy in the central Mediterranean 
and Libya. At the level of its founding treaties, the 
EU is committed to international law and respect for 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. If 
there are reasonable doubts as to whether the EU may 
sidestep its own constitutional principles, one needs 
to recall the principle of equality before the law as 
well as the EU’s voluntary commitment to the Rome 
Statute. 
The overriding political interest in effective migra-
tion control has led to highly problematic legal shifts 
in European foreign and security policy. The rule 
of law dimension of the EU’s external action should 
therefore receive more attention than before. In con-
crete terms, the EU could resume the process of formal 
accession to the ECHR and thus deepen the constitu-
tional foundations of European foreign and security 
policy. This would empower the EU to counter the 
continuing erosion of the multilateral legal order, 
but also the erosion of the rule of law within its own 
borders. Germany should place the rule of law at the 
heart of its 2020 EU Council Presidency. The contro-
versial introduction of Qualified Majority Decisions 
in the CFSP must be accompanied by the strengthen-
ing the EU as a community of law. 
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